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Political Prospects in Peru

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POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN PERU

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for the establishment of an elected civil government and the basic problems which would confront such a government.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Peru's present political difficulties are the result of pressures for political and social change generated in a long static society undergoing industrialization and urbanization. These pressures have been building up for a generation. A resolution of the consequent political tensions is not likely to be accomplished for many years. (*Paras. 1-6*)

B. The present Military Junta seized power in July 1962 in order to prevent direct or indirect accession to power by APRA¹ as the result of the 1962 presidential and congressional election. It has failed in its efforts to develop a political coalition which would ensure the defeat of APRA in the new election which it is committed to hold in June 1963. An election with the candidates now running could be as close and inconclusive as that of 1962. (*Paras. 7-11, 20-24*)

C. Inasmuch as the military are in a position to control the outcome of the election, they will probably carry out the Junta's commitment to hold it. If, contrary to expectation, Haya should win an undeniable victory, they could still intervene to prevent his inauguration and to establish a military government which

¹ *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, a radical leftist but anti-Communist party established in 1924. In its earlier days APRA was violently revolutionary and was repeatedly suppressed by the conservative military. However, in more recent times its program has been considerably moderated and it has sought to achieve power by political action.

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would retain power for an unspecified period. There is no doubt that the military have this capability or that they would exercise it if convinced that it was necessary to do so in order to prevent APRA from coming to power. (*Paras. 25, 28-29*)

D. The Peruvian Communist and pro-Castro groups have little prospect of achieving power in the near future. The Peruvian armed forces and security services are capable of controlling subversive activities short of a well-organized guerrilla movement or a revolutionary uprising on a national scale. (*Paras. 16-19*)

E. In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try its methods. (*Para. 34*)

DISCUSSION

I. BACKGROUND

A. Basic Factors

1. Peru has neither a broadly based political system nor even effective national unity in the sense of a common language and culture. The highland Indians, about half the population, still exist outside of the mainstream of national life and in precarious circumstances. Political power is monopolized by a small oligarchy composed of agrarian, commercial, mining, and industrial interests allied with the military and the church hierarchy. In the factional struggles for power within the oligarchy, the decisive factor has been the military, which is still the ultimate arbiter in Peruvian politics.

2. The massive Andean mountains divide Peru into three distinct regions and make transportation and communications facilities difficult to construct and extremely costly to maintain. The modern sector of the economy is largely confined to the narrow coastal plain in which are concentrated about 30 percent of the population and the commercial agriculture, petroleum production, manufacturing, and trade that

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together account for over half the country's gross national product (GNP). The Sierra (about 27 percent of the total area and 55 percent of the total population) supplies mineral and some agricultural products, but most of its more than five million inhabitants live in primitive conditions outside the money economy. The Selva, the vast, sparsely settled region east of the Andes, is still largely isolated from the rest of Peru.

3. The Peruvian economy benefits from a pattern of exports which is more diversified than that in most Latin American countries. In recent years decreased world market prices for zinc, lead, copper, and petroleum have been compensated for by increased revenues from exports of silver, cotton, and sugar, and by development of other exports such as iron ore and fishmeal, a particularly important new product. As a result GNP, which has grown an average of four to five percent annually over the past two decades, is estimated to have increased by 5.5 percent in 1962.

4. The bulk of the population, however, does not share in the economic progress indicated by these increases in GNP. On the contrary, real income for many is probably declining. Per capita income in the Sierra is about the same as that of stagnant Bolivia; that in the Selva is about the same as that of poverty-stricken Haiti. Even in the coastal region, where per capita income is about average for Latin America, there are great disparities of wealth and well-being. In Lima and other cities, conspicuous consumption exists in the presence of abject poverty.

B. Political Background ²

5. The dominant Peruvian elite has been successful in barring popular forces from exerting independent influence in the national political system. However, pressure for political and social change, to make the government more responsive to the electorate and to ameliorate the condition of the masses, has been mounting with the growth of the urban middle class, the rising importance of organized labor, the increasing participation of *mestizos* in political activity, the migration of highland Indians to coastal areas, and the rapid increase in population, which has reached a rate of three percent per annum.

6. The established order in Peru was first challenged by the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), founded by Victor Haya de la Torre in 1924. Haya drew inspiration from Marxist doctrine, but also from the Mexican Revolution—his movement was always explicitly native American (i.e., Latin American) and came to be vigorously anti-Communist. APRA gained considerable support in organized labor and in intellectual circles, and developed the only effective "precinct-level" political organization in Peru. It was greatly feared by the oligarchy, who considered the *Apristas* more effective and therefore more danger-

² For details regarding APRA and other political parties, see Appendix A.

ous than the Communists. APRA was repeatedly suppressed by the military, with consequent violence and bloodshed by both sides which still embitters Peruvian politics.

7. Haya de la Torre was probably elected to the Presidency of Peru in 1931, but was counted out by the incumbent government. APRA eventually came to realize that it could gain political influence only by making its voting strength available to ambitious oligarchs in return for promised favors. On this basis it helped to elect Jose Bustamante to the Presidency in 1945. In 1948 Bustamante's government was overthrown by an anti-*Aprista* general, Manuel Odria, who ruled as a dictator for two years and then arranged for his election as President for six more. Under Odria's rule Peru enjoyed relative prosperity and economic progress. This success led him to suppose that his chosen candidate could be elected in a fair election in 1956. To his surprise and chagrin, his man ran a poor third and Manuel Prado was elected with the support of APRA. Prado's close competitor in the election of 1956 was Fernando Belaunde, a demagogic member of the elite who preached reform and drew to himself the support of some of the bitterest opponents of APRA, including the Communists as well as middle class reformists and elements of the oligarchy.

C. The Election of 1962

8. On the basis of its relations with President Prado, APRA believed that in 1962 it could at last elect Haya de la Torre to the Presidency of Peru in a free and fair election. Haya was opposed by both Belaunde and Odria. These three ran virtually a dead heat. Because of the vote for minor candidates, none of them gained the one-third plurality required for direct election.³ An APRA dominated coalition, however, gained almost a majority of the congressional seats, and consequently would have had the principal voice in the congressional selection of a President from among the three leading candidates, in accordance with the Constitution.

9. The leaders of the armed forces privately made it clear that they would never permit APRA to come to power, suggesting publicly that APRA could win the election only by the Prado administration's tolerance of electoral fraud. After the election the military brought against APRA formal charges of "massive fraud" which were rejected by the National Election Board. Despite the now imminent threat of a military coup, the civilian political leaders were unable to negotiate a formula which would serve to preserve constitutional government, principally on account of the intransigence of Belaunde, who expected the military to install him in the Presidency. When Haya and Odria finally

³ Haya received 557,047 votes (32.9 percent); Belaunde, 544,180 (32.1 percent); and Odria, 480,798 (28.4 percent).

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reached an agreement pursuant to which Congress would elect Odria (believed to be seriously ill) to the Presidency, with an *Aprista* as his Vice President and probable early successor, the military deposed President Prado, installed a military junta, and annulled the 1962 election.

10. The military were moved by their ancient enmity toward APRA and by fear that APRA, in power, would try to deprive them of their privileged position in public life and subordinate them to civil control. In this judgment they were probably correct. They acted with the approval or acquiescence of most political elements, which foresaw that no stable civil government could be established on the basis of the inconclusive election results and were more concerned to have order preserved by an authoritative military regime than to maintain constitutional processes. Even the *Aprista* rank and file had no stomach to oppose the military with a general strike called by the APRA leadership. With the collapse of the strike even APRA accepted the situation in return for promises of no persecution and a free election in June 1963.

II. THE MILITARY REGIME

11. In July 1962 the functions of the Peruvian Presidency were assumed by a four-man junta composed of General Ricardo Perez Godoy, President of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, and the commanding officers of the three services—General Nicolas Lindley Lopez (Army), General Pedro Vargas Prada (Air Force), and Admiral Juan Torres Matos (Navy). As *primus inter pares*, Perez Godoy occupied the Presidential palace and assumed the ceremonial functions of the Presidency. The other Junta members took charge of their respective service ministries. Other military officers were assigned to take charge of the other ministries.

12. In March 1963 Perez Godoy was ousted by his colleagues in the Junta.⁴ The charge that Perez Godoy tended to arrogate to himself too much of the prestige and powers of the Presidency covered a multitude of his personal and policy conflicts with other members of the Junta and influential military leaders. It was clear, nevertheless, that Perez Godoy had in fact become a man his colleagues could not trust. By his acts and statements he had even aroused fears that he was coming to see himself as the leader of the country's popular forces. None of the remaining members of the Junta is devoted to the democratic process, but in ousting Perez Godoy for personal presumption, they renewed their own commitment to hold elections in June.

⁴ The initiative came from Vargas Prada, who apparently took umbrage when Perez Godoy refused to countenance the wholesale proscription of APRA. The decisive factor was the delayed adherence of Lindley Lopez, a strictly professional soldier who feels that the military should not be involved in ordinary politics and consequently that the earliest feasible establishment of an acceptable civil government is desirable. The role of Torres Matos was passive.

13. Despite its authoritarian character, the Junta has permitted freedom of speech and of the press, including the right to criticize the Junta's decisions, and has been slow to take forceful measures to control popular unrest. It has tended to yield when specific measures have aroused strong opposition from powerful vested interests. Nevertheless, some of the measures which it has adopted presage fundamental changes in the traditional relation of the Peruvian Government to the economy and the society. It has established an elaborate system of national economic and social planning which could lead to a better utilization of resources, but which also has strong overtones of economic nationalism and statism. It has actually begun to distribute land to landless peasants, particularly in the La Convencion area. It has also begun drafting a comprehensive labor code.

14. Such measures are revolutionary in their implications and inconsistent with the Junta's professed caretaker status. They partially reflect the activity and purposes of subordinate officials determined to transform Peru. This tendency derives important support from graduates of the *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares* (the Peruvian War College), where authoritarian-minded but reformist professors (including one known Communist) are highly influential.

15. The Junta has had such an anti-APRA fixation that it was blind to the potentialities for Communist subversion. It welcomed and supported Communist efforts to wrest the control of labor unions from APRA. There ensued a rash of Communist-instigated labor violence and agrarian unrest which the Junta blamed on APRA, refusing to take effective action against the Communists. Finally the Communist-instigated destruction of \$4 million worth of US mining property at La Oroya in December 1962 brought the issue of Communist violence to a head. Under the pressure of a widespread public reaction against its coddling of Communists, the Junta in January carried out a roundup of over 600 radical activists, mostly Communists. Since then labor violence and sabotage have subsided and most of those arrested have been quietly released.

III. COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES

16. The Communist and pro-Castro movements have been fragmented as a result of the personalistic nature of their leadership and sharp differences over tactics. The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), with an estimated 8,000-9,000 members, is the largest group. Its support comes mainly from among industrial workers, professional people, and intellectuals in the Lima-Callao area and the central and southern Andean regions. The PCP has utilized various front activities to attract numerous sympathizers, particularly in labor and student groups. Communists and sympathizers now lead most of the important student federations formerly dominated by *Apristas*.

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17. The national leadership of the PCP has generally favored cooperation with the incumbent ruling groups against APRA. Communists and Communist sympathizers were included in the lists of congressional candidates of all parties except APRA and the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) in 1962. They are campaigning for seats in the 1963 elections on all major party lists, except APRA, and as independents. Within the PCP, however, a group of younger members have cited the party's ineffectiveness as grounds for advocating more aggressive policies and tactics. Their program, advocating violent revolution and closer identification with the Castro and Chinese Communist positions, thus far has been rejected by the old-line PCP leadership. The PCP leadership in southern Peru, however, follows a more militant line and cooperates with dissident Communist elements.

18. Castroite, Trotskyite, and other dissident splinter groups advocate "activist" programs stressing immediate revolution and guerrilla activities.⁵ Except during the July-December 1962 period, however, when their operations had the forbearance if not the blessing of the Junta, they have not been effective.

19. In short, the Peruvian Communist and pro-Castro groups have little prospect of achieving power in the near future. The Peruvian armed forces and security services are capable of controlling subversive activities short of a well-organized guerrilla movement or a revolutionary uprising on a national scale. Over the short run, the Communists' best chances for increasing their influence appear to lie in continued cooperation with and infiltration of anti-APRA groups, particularly in the event of an open conflict between APRA and the military. Over the longer run the government's continued failure to meet substantially the increasing aspirations of the *mestizo* and Indian masses could provide the extremists with an opportunity to foment widespread disorder and possibly a chance to attain power.

IV. ELECTION PROSPECTS

20. Thus far the Junta has failed signally in its efforts to bring about such a combination of political forces as would ensure the defeat of Haya de la Torre in the presidential election now scheduled for 9 June 1963. The three major presidential candidates are the same as in 1962; none of them has been willing to yield to any other or to a fusion candidate. The Junta was not even able to limit the number of candidacies to three, in order to ensure that someone would receive the one-third plurality required for election. The 1963 election, if held, will therefore be a rerun of the abortive election of 1962, with little chance of producing a clearly decisive result.⁶

⁵ See Appendix B for more information on these groups.

⁶ See Appendix A for further detail regarding the parties participating in the 1963 election.

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21. Meanwhile, however, there have been some shifts in the political lineup which could affect the result. Some of these are favorable to Belaunde's prospects. He has secured the support of the Christian Democrats, whose candidate received 49,000 votes in 1962. He is also likely to get many of the 59,000 votes cast for minor leftwing parties in 1962. On the other hand, Belaunde has some new obstacles to overcome this year. To many people he is now the government candidate. Many of those who were with Belaunde in 1962 remember his irresponsible antics after the last election and will be reluctant to support him again. In addition, even within his own political organization there are people dissatisfied with his concessions to the PDC and with his juggling of the party's congressional lists. The fourth candidate in the new election, Mario Samame Boggio, is likely to draw more votes away from Belaunde than from anyone else.

22. Odria's prospects have improved. A physical injury curtailed his campaign in 1962. He is now in apparent good health and is campaigning vigorously. The tensions and violence since the 1962 elections will enhance his appeal as a "strongman" who gave Peru order, progress, and prosperity, 1948-1956. For these reasons most of the *Pradistas* who supported Haya de la Torre in 1962 are now supporting Odria. These gains, however, may be somewhat offset by the cavalier manner in which Odria has treated aspirants for places on his congressional lists.

23. Haya de la Torre's electoral prospects have been reduced by the loss of *Pradista* support, including the financial support required to meet campaign expenses, and by the alienation of some *Apristas*, including Manuel Seoane, one of the party's most effective campaigners. Many voters may also have concluded that the military will never permit Haya to take office—that a vote for him is a vote thrown away. Nevertheless, APRA still has the only effective precinct organization in Peru and has regained the advantage of running in opposition to the status quo. Haya has launched his campaign ahead of his rivals and has engendered enough early popular enthusiasm to alarm his military and political opponents.

24. The election, if held, is likely to be close; the outcome cannot be predicted with confidence. For this reason, there are signs of increasing nervousness among the military and some elements of the oligarchy, which could lead to a move to preclude the possibility of an APRA victory by excluding APRA from participation in the election on a legal pretext or by cancelling the election. Since the present Junta could not take such action with good countenance, its replacement would probably be required. The idea is under active consideration within the high command of the army and the air force.

25. Inasmuch as the military are in a position to control the outcome of the election (unless the vote for Haya should be overwhelming, which is unlikely), they will probably carry out the Junta's commitment to

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hold it. If, contrary to expectation, Haya should win an undeniable victory, they could still intervene to prevent his inauguration.

V. POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS

26. If the election should be held and Belaunde should be elected, he would initially have the support of the military, of important elements of the oligarchy, of many middle class reformists, and also of the Communists. The short-term prospects for political stability would be reasonably good, although some die-hard *Apristas* might cause some disturbances. In some respects, Belaunde's conduct in office would be likely to resemble that of President Goulart in Brazil—suspected crypto-Communists would be appointed to some offices, Communist infiltration and control of organized labor would be facilitated, and an ardent nationalism would generally characterize the attitude of the new administration. Right as well as leftwing supporters would urge the adoption of policies inimical to foreign investments in Peru, particularly to the US oil companies operating there. At the same time, Belaunde's extravagant designs for the development of the Peruvian hinterland would require him to seek enormous amounts of foreign, principally US, financial and technical aid. These inconsistencies would be likely to produce confusion and strain in US relations with Peru. Over the longer term, the virtual impossibility of satisfying the conflicting interests of Belaunde's heterogeneous following and the probable implacable hostility of the hard core of APRA would be likely to lead to considerable internal tension and political instability.

27. Odria, if elected, would almost certainly provide a stronger and more realistic administration than Belaunde, but would tend to rely upon authoritarian controls. He would be keenly interested in the further development of the existing Peruvian economy, but unlikely to expend significant resources on the less immediately profitable development of the hinterland. He would pay lip service to social reform, but would probably not do much in that direction.

28. If, perchance, Haya de la Torre should win the election, the military would almost certainly intervene to prevent his inauguration. Even if he were allowed to take office, he would have to face not only constant political obstruction and agitation, but also the constant threat of a military coup. Haya is committed to the reformist goals of the Alliance for Progress, but, in these circumstances, it is unlikely that he would be able to accomplish much in the way of effective reform.

29. If the armed forces should again intervene to prevent the election or the inauguration of Haya de la Torre, they would almost certainly do so under new leadership free of any commitment to hold early elections. Such a coup would have substantial civilian support, or at least

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acquiescence, although it might encounter more resistance than was the case in 1962. There is no doubt that the military have the power to impose their rule, should they decide to do so.

30. A new military regime established in these circumstances would not be a temporary caretaker government. It would have to face up to urgent problems of economic development and social amelioration, and it would have to seek to establish a broad base of popular political support. Almost certainly there would be differences within the regime regarding the measures of reform and development to be undertaken. The circumstances, however, would tend to favor the eventual development of a Peronist-type regime—that is, an authoritarian government military in origin but catering to the urban proletariat for political support. Such a government would be highly nationalistic as well as radically reformist.

VI. THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

31. Given reasonably stable political conditions, the Peruvian economy should continue to expand at about the present rate of growth, five percent of GNP per annum. This expansion, however, has been of little benefit to the Peruvian people.

32. A critical economic problem arises from the pressure of population on the land in the Sierra. Although the inhabitants of the Sierra are not a present factor in Peruvian politics, their increasing unrest is a matter of great potential political significance. A simple redistribution of large landholdings cannot solve the problem, since the land presently under cultivation is not sufficient to provide adequate farms for all the landless peasants and subsistence farmers. Moreover, to break up the plantations which now produce major export crops, notably sugar and cotton, would reduce the foreign exchange earnings required for further economic development.

33. Satisfaction of the growing popular demand for a greater measure of economic security and well-being, upon which fundamental political stability depends, will require the extensive development of new areas of cultivation, principally through irrigation in the arid coastal area and through opening access to the trans-Andean region. It will also require the development of employment opportunities, housing, and sanitation for rural migrants to the cities, and the general education and technical training needed to qualify them for urban employment. Such developments, particularly those related to irrigation and trans-Andean transportation, will be technically difficult and highly expensive. The accomplishment of such a program would require not only an effective mobilization of Peruvian resources, but also large amounts of foreign (presumably US) financial and technical aid over a long period of time.

34. In the past, Peruvian governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try its methods.

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APPENDIX A

POLITICAL PARTIES CONTESTING THE 1963 ELECTIONS

1. The *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA) was founded by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in 1924, while in exile in Mexico City. APRA was originally conceived as an international Latin American political movement. Under Marxist and Mexican influences, it advocated resistance to "Yankee Imperialism," the political unity of Latin America, the integration of the Indian and Europeanized elements in Latin American society, and the nationalization of land and industry. The movement took root only in Peru, where the *Partido Aprista Peruano* (still commonly called APRA) was established in 1931. However, the Peruvian party does have loose associations with other democratic-reformist parties such as *Accion Democratica* in Venezuela. Because of its historical origins, it is vulnerable to proscriptions against international political parties designed to curb the Communists.

2. In 1931 Haya de la Torre apparently won the Peruvian presidential election, but the incumbent government manipulated the returns so as to deny him the victory. Since that time APRA has been forced to operate underground, except during the period 1945-1948 and from 1956 to the present. It was the decisive factor in the election of Jose Bustamante in 1945 and Manuel Prado in 1956, but fell just short of electing Haya de la Torre in 1962.

3. In the course of 30 years there has been a notable evolution in APRA's political character. It responded with revolutionary violence to its suppression in 1931, but by 1956 had concluded that its goals could be achieved only by evolutionary political means. Its original anti-US attitude has been reversed—it is now in full accord with the Alliance for Progress, although it would probably still seek to assert some nationalistic and socialistic control over the operations of major US private corporations in Peru. Since 1945 APRA has been vigorously anti-Communist. Except when hindered by anti-APRA governments, it has proved itself to be the only effective competitor of the Communists for the leadership of Peruvian labor and student organizations.

4. The relatively moderate attitude of the aging APRA leadership, particularly the expedient decisions to collaborate with Prado in 1956 and Odria in 1962, has alienated some of the younger party militants. *APRA Rebelde*, composed of admirers of Fidel Castro, broke off in 1959. Continued political frustration would be likely to cause a further erosion



of such elements, unless the party itself should turn again from political to revolutionary action. In that case, it would probably lose its more moderate elements.

5. The Popular Action movement (*Accion Popular*—AP) was formed in 1956 to consolidate the various groups that had supported Fernando Belaunde Terry's strong bid for the Presidency as an independent. Its diverse elements include members of the oligarchy, intellectuals, dissatisfied *Apristas*, and extreme leftists, including Communists, seeking a vehicle to defeat APRA and attain power for themselves. Its program is nationalistic and leftist, with something for every constituent group. In his attempt to capture APRA's mass support, Belaunde has appealed for agrarian reform, a nationwide program of community action, and a vast program of roadbuilding to open up the Selva and break down Peruvian regionalism. In his appeal for conservative political and financial backing, Belaunde stresses the threat APRA poses for Peruvian society and advocates moderate economic policies. Belaunde professes friendship for the US, where he has traveled and studied, and seeks US financial and technical assistance. While Belaunde and the AP leadership have refused to make any statement that would alienate Communist support, their present electoral alliance with the small but strongly anti-Communist Christian Democrat Party has worked against Communist infiltration of the AP-PDC congressional lists.

6. The Christian Democrat Party (*Partido Democrita Cristiano*—PDC) differs from the other contending parties in not following the traditional Latin American pattern of personalized leadership. It has a program based on the papal encyclicals. Since its founding in Arequipa in 1955, the PDC has gained little numerical strength outside that area. The party has shown a strong bias against US private investments in Peru and tends to condemn both the US and the USSR in its pronouncements on international affairs.

7. The National Odriista Union (*Union Nacional Odriista*—UNO) of General Manuel Odria is a purely personalistic organization formed to support the ex-dictator (1948–1950) and former President (1950–1956) in the 1962 elections. It draws support from all sectors of Peruvian society and depends heavily upon the relative prosperity and order achieved under Odria's control in the 1948–1956 period. The lower classes, particularly in the urban areas, benefitted from the public works programs carried out by Odria and the upper classes have confidence in his ability to control the Communists and the trade unions. The UNO program advocates reforms similar, in the main, to those urged by APRA and the AP, with perhaps greater emphasis upon public works and industrialization. Odria's appeal is typified by his campaign tactics of stressing "deeds, not words."

8. The Union of the Peruvian People (*Union del Pueblo Peruano*—UPP), was founded in the latter part of 1962 by a group of young leftist-

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oriented professionals. The UPP's appeal is to groups dissatisfied with the candidates and programs of the other Peruvian parties, and particularly to ex-Belaundistas. It follows the AP's opportunistic line in promising all things to all people. The UPP strategy appears to be based on the expectation that its presidential candidate, Mario Samame Boggio, Rector of the National Engineering University, will attract support as the only new candidate in the scheduled 1963 elections. APRA has tried to build up the UPP and its candidate, in an obvious attempt to split Belaunde's following.



APPENDIX B


EXTREMIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN PERU


1. The Peruvian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Peruano*—PCP) had its origins in the Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP) formed in 1928 by a group of Marxist intellectuals and labor leaders. The guiding spirit of the group, Jose Carlos Mariategui, one of Peru's most brilliant intellectuals, died during the crisis within the PSP that originated, in 1929, over affiliation with the Comintern. While most of the PSP members agreed to change the party's name (to PCP) and affiliate with the Communist International, a minority group withdrew and established the present PSP. The PCP has survived subsequent factionalism and purges in its continued adherence to whatever line Moscow dictates. The PCP secured, first, official toleration for its labor activities competing against APRA (1930–1934), and then considerable freedom, though not legal status, in the 1939–1945 period, in return for helping elect Manuel Prado to his first term in office. Whenever the PCP has not had official encouragement, as in the 1945–1948 and 1956–1962 periods, it has lost ground to APRA in the labor movement. The PCP leadership, following the defection of Eudocio Ravines in 1940, has been plagued with personalism. The present principal PCP leaders are: Raul Acosta, the Secretary General; Jorge del Prado, Secretary for Press and Propaganda; Enrique Flores, Secretary for Finance; and Dr. Jorge Veldez, head of the party's Control Commission. Genero Carnero Checa, editor and author of numerous pro-Communist and anti-US publications, may have an even greater influence in the party than the nominal PCP leadership, despite his reported expulsion from the party in the mid-1930s.

2. The other extremist groups in Peru have considerably smaller memberships than the PCP. The Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) and the Revolutionary Workers Party (Trotskyite) (POR (T)) are both Trotskyite, have an estimated total membership of about 1,000, and are strongest in southern Peru and in the Department of Lima. During 1962 one of their members, the much publicized "guerrilla" leader Hugo Blanco, incited rural unrest and encouraged peasant invasions of large estates in the La Convencion area of the Department of Cuzco. The Peruvian Leninist Party (PCPL), an offshoot of the PCP, has about 500 members, mostly in the central region. The Peruvian Communal Movement (MCP) is an even smaller group primarily active among the Indians in the central Andes. The Movement of the Revolutionary



Left (MIR) is the former *APRA Rebelde*, a radical offshoot of APRA. It has limited support in Trujillo, the traditional APRA stronghold in northern Peru, and some adherents in Cuzco. The National Liberation Front (FLN), established to unite these fragmented Communist elements in the 1962 elections, polled only about 35,000 votes for its candidate, General Cesar Pando. The two Communist paramilitary fronts, the National Revolutionary Front (FNR) and the Trotskyite Leftist Revolutionary Front (FIR), formed in early 1961 and 1962 respectively, have not been notably successful in coordinating the subversive activities of these various groups.





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